Shevuot 3:5שְׁבוּעוֹתSelf and others, tangible and intangible
What an oath of utterance can be about
The question
Does an oath bind about others, trivial acts, or the past, or only about the future?
A broad rule illustrated by three examples, each sworn future and past, then Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva debate future-only in two exchanges.
Tap a Hebrew word for its meaning. Tap a bold phrase to see the words it translates.
1Self, others, substance or not
An oath of utterance reaches every kind of subject — one's own or others', of substance or not.
אֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ, וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁל אֲחֵרִים, וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן מַמָּשׁ, וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶם מַמָּשׁ.
Both matters of one's own and matters of others, — such as "I will give to so-and-so" — and both matters of substance and matters of no substance — such as sleeping, or throwing a pebble into the sea — are alike for an oath of utterance.
2 notes
וְאֶחָד דְּבָרִים שֶׁל אֲחֵרִים
- Bartenura: 'matters that concern others' means an oath like 'I will give such-and-such to so-and-so' — an act directed at another person.
- The point is that the utterance oath is not limited to one's own eating or fasting.
- It binds equally when the oath is about doing or not doing something involving someone else.
Bartenura
דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶם מַמָּשׁ
- Bartenura: 'no substance' covers two senses — an act that leaves no tangible result, like sleeping; and an act of no benefit, like 'I will throw a pebble into the sea.'
- Such oaths have no physical 'thing' attached, yet they still bind.
- This sets up Rabbi Yishmael's challenge in the next unit.
Bartenura
2How so?
The mishnah asks: how so? — and gives a long list of examples.
כֵּיצַד.
How so?
3Give, sleep, throw a pebble
A run of paired oaths — give/not give, slept/not slept, threw/not threw — past and future.
אָמַר, שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֶתֵּן לְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶתֵּן, שֶׁנָּתַתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא נָתַתִּי, שֶׁאִישַׁן וְשֶׁלֹּא אִישַׁן, שֶׁיָּשַׁנְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא יָשַׁנְתִּי, שֶׁאֶזְרֹק צְרוֹר לַיָּם וְשֶׁלֹּא אֶזְרֹק, שֶׁזָּרַקְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא זָרַקְתִּי.
He said, "On my oath, I will give to so-and-so," or "I will not give," "I gave," or "I did not give" — matters of others — "I will sleep," or "I will not sleep," "I slept," or "I did not sleep" — matters of no substance — "I will throw a pebble into the sea," or "I will not throw," "I threw," or "I did not throw" — an act that helps no one.
4Rabbi Yishmael: only the future
Rabbi Yishmael: one is liable only for oaths about the future — that is what the verse says.
רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעָתִיד לָבֹא, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא ה) לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב.
Rabbi Yishmael says: one is liable only for [oaths about] what is yet to come, as it is said, "to do harm or to do good" (Vayikra 5:4): words about what one will yet do.
1 note
אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעָתִיד לָבֹא
- Bartenura: Rabbi Yishmael reads the verse 'to do evil or to do good' as describing only future action — so only future oaths carry liability for the bittui offering.
- On his view, oaths about the past ('I ate,' 'I did not eat') are not included.
- This narrows the four forms of the opening mishnah back down toward two.
Bartenura
5Rabbi Akiva's challenge
Rabbi Akiva presses: even your reading would exclude oaths that involve no harm or good.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אִם כֵּן אֵין לִי אֶלָּא דְבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה, דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה מִנַּיִן.
Rabbi Akiva said to him: if so, I have only matters that involve doing harm or good; matters that involve no harm or good — from where [do we know them]? Like "I will throw a pebble into the sea," which helps or harms no one.
1 note
דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה מִנַּיִן
- Rabbi Akiva's counter: if you take the verse 'evil or good' literally, then even some future oaths — like 'I will throw a pebble,' which is neither harm nor benefit — would be excluded.
- So the verse cannot be read so narrowly; something must extend it.
- This pushes Rabbi Yishmael to explain his method in the next unit.
Bartenura
6From the verse's broadening
Rabbi Yishmael answers: those extra cases come from the verse's broad wording.
אָמַר לוֹ, מֵרִבּוּי הַכָּתוּב.
He said to him: from the broadening of the verse. Its words "whatever a man may utter in an oath" (Vayikra 5:4) widen it.
1 note
מֵרִבּוּי הַכָּתוּב
- Bartenura: Rabbi Yishmael points to the broad phrase 'whatever a man may utter with an oath' (Vayikra 5:4) as an amplification that pulls in oaths with no harm or benefit.
- Behind this is a method dispute: Rabbi Akiva reads the Torah by 'amplifications and limitations,' while Rabbi Yishmael reads by 'general-and-specific.'
- Both agree the verse's wording stretches beyond the literal 'evil or good.' They differ on how far.
- Bartenura: the halacha follows Rabbi Akiva.
Bartenura
7Then it broadens the past too
Rabbi Akiva's final thrust: if the verse stretches that far, it stretches to the past too.
אָמַר לוֹ, אִם רִבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ, רִבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ:
He said to him: if the verse broadened [it] for this, — oaths that help or harm no one — the verse broadened [it] for that — oaths about the past.
The picture The picture in words
Rabbi Yishmael makes him liable only for oaths about the future, even one that helps or harms no one, like throwing a pebble into the sea. Rabbi Akiva answers that if the verse is widened that far, it is widened to oaths about the past too.
1 note
אִם רִבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ, רִבָּה הַכָּתוּב לְכָךְ
- Bartenura: Rabbi Akiva turns Rabbi Yishmael's own amplification against him.
- If the verse's broad wording can stretch past 'evil or good' to cover neutral acts, it can equally stretch to cover oaths about the PAST.
- So all four forms — future and past, harmful and neutral — carry liability.
Bartenura
Summary
An oath of utterance reaches every kind of subject: acts concerning oneself or others, and matters with substance or without. The mishnah lists paired examples — give and not-give, sleep and not-sleep, throw a pebble and not-throw — across both future and past. Rabbi Yishmael holds that only future oaths carry liability, reading the verse 'to do evil or to do good' as future language. Rabbi Akiva counters that the verse's broad wording already stretches to neutral acts, so it must stretch to the past as well, which keeps all four forms.