Keritot 3:10כְּרִיתוֹתMany labors, one lapse
Akiva and Eliezer on Shabbat
The question
If someone does many Shabbat labors in one lapse, does he owe one offering or many?
Rabbi Akiva asks Rabbi Eliezer, who argues from niddah, then from minors, then from an animal; Rabbi Akiva rejects all three.
Tap a Hebrew word for its meaning. Tap a bold phrase to see the words it translates.
1Rabbi Akiva's question
Rabbi Akiva asked Rabbi Eliezer: one who in a single lapse performs many derivative labors of one primary labor across several Shabbatot — what is the law?
אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, שָׁאַלְתִּי אֶת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הָעוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכוֹת הַרְבֵּה בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת הַרְבֵּה מֵעֵין מְלָאכָה אַחַת, בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, מַה הוּא.
Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: one who does many labors on many Shabbatot, all of the same kind as one labor, derivative labors of one primary labor, in one lapse of awareness, what is [the law]?
Concepts here
1 note
מְלָאכוֹת הַרְבֵּה בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת הַרְבֵּה מֵעֵין מְלָאכָה אַחַת
- "Many labors of one category" means many sub-labors (toladot) all derived from a single primary labor (av).
- He did them across several Shabbatot but in one unbroken lapse of awareness.
- Rabbi Akiva is really asking two things: whether different Shabbatot divide the liability, and whether the sub-labors count separately.
Bartenura
2One or many?
The two sides: one offering for all, or one for each.
חַיָּב אַחַת עַל כֻּלָּן, אוֹ אַחַת עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת.
Is he liable to one [offering] for all of them, or one for each and every one?
3Rabbi Eliezer: each one
Rabbi Eliezer answered: liable for each and every one — and proved it by an 'all the more so' argument.
אָמַר לִי, חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, מִקַּל וָחֹמֶר,
He said to me: He is liable for each and every one, by an 'all the more so' argument:
Concepts here
4From niddah
His argument: if menstruating women, under a ban with no many branches, bring liability for each woman, surely Shabbat, with its many labors, does too.
וּמָה אִם הַנִּדָּה, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה וְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה, חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, שַׁבָּת, שֶׁיֶּשׁ בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה וְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת.
If a menstruating woman, who does not have many branches and many sin-offerings, only relations with her being forbidden, [makes one] liable for each and every one, five offerings for five such women, [then] Shabbat, which has many branches and many sin-offerings, its many labors and their offshoots, is it not right that he be liable for each and every one?
Concepts here
1 note
וּמָה אִם הַנִּדָּה
- A niddah carries only one type of prohibition — intercourse — yet one who has relations with five niddot in a lapse owes a sin-offering for each, since they are separate bodies.
- Shabbat has many primary labors and sub-labors, far more "branches" than niddah.
- So all the more so, Rabbi Eliezer argues, each separate labor should carry its own chatat.
Bartenura
5Niddah has two warnings
Rabbi Akiva refutes: with a menstruating woman there are two prohibitions — on him and on her — but Shabbat has only one, so the argument fails.
אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ, לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַנִּדָּה, שֶׁיֶּשׁ בָּהּ שְׁתֵּי אַזְהָרוֹת, שֶׁהוּא מֻזְהָר עַל הַנִּדָּה וְהַנִּדָּה מֻזְהֶרֶת עָלָיו, תֹּאמַר בַּשַּׁבָּת, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה אֶחָת.
I said to him: No. If you said [it] of a menstruating woman, who is under two prohibitions — he is forbidden to her, and she is forbidden to him — will you say [it] of Shabbat, which has only one prohibition? Perhaps the second prohibition is what divides her offerings.
1 note
שֶׁיֶּשׁ בָּהּ שְׁתֵּי אַזְהָרוֹת
- Niddah carries two prohibitions at once — the man is warned against her, and she is warned against him.
- Shabbat has only a single prohibition.
- Rabbi Akiva argues the extra warning is what divides niddah's offerings, so it cannot prove anything about Shabbat.
Bartenura
6Minor girls prove it
Rabbi Eliezer answers: relations with menstruating minors prove it — only one prohibition there, yet he is liable for each one.
אָמַר לִי, הַבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה אַחַת וְחַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת.
He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruating] minor girls will prove it, for they have only one prohibition, since a minor is not bound by the mitzvot, and he is liable for each and every one. So one prohibition is enough to divide the offerings.
1 note
הַבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת יוֹכִיחַ
- With minor niddot there is only one warning, since a minor is exempt from the mitzvot and cannot be "warned."
- Yet a man who has relations with five minor niddot in a lapse is liable for each.
- So a single warning is enough to divide the offerings — undercutting Akiva's objection.
Bartenura
7Minors have a later warning
Akiva refutes again: minors are forbidden later when they grow up, but Shabbat has no prohibition now or later, so they differ.
אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ, לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַּבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן עַכְשָׁיו, יֵשׁ בָּהֶן לְאַחַר זְמָן, תֹּאמַר בַּשַּׁבָּת, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ לֹא עַכְשָׁיו וְלֹא לְאַחַר זְמָן.
I said to him: No. If you said [it] of minor girls, who, though they have no [prohibition] now, will have [one] later, will you say [it] of Shabbat, which has none, neither now nor later?
1 note
שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן עַכְשָׁיו, יֵשׁ בָּהֶן לְאַחַר זְמָן
- A minor girl cannot be "warned" now, but when she matures the second warning will apply.
- So she has a latent two-warning status that Shabbat never has.
- Rabbi Akiva argues this hidden difference still blocks the inference to Shabbat.
Bartenura
8An animal proves it
Rabbi Eliezer answers: relations with an animal prove it — never a second prohibition, yet liable for each act.
אָמַר לִי, הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה יוֹכִיחַ.
He said to me: One who has relations with an animal will prove it. There is never a second prohibition there, yet he is liable for each act.
1 note
הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה יוֹכִיחַ
- Relations with an animal never carries two warnings — now or later — yet one is liable for each and every act.
- So a single warning suffices to divide the offerings, and Shabbat should be the same.
Bartenura
9An animal is like Shabbat
Akiva closes: the animal case is itself uncertain, just like Shabbat — so it proves nothing.
אָמַרְתִּי לוֹ, בְּהֵמָה כַשַּׁבָּת.
I said to him: An animal is like Shabbat. I am asking about it just as about Shabbat, so it proves nothing.
Concepts here
1 note
בְּהֵמָה כַשַּׁבָּת
- Rabbi Akiva replies that the animal case is itself in doubt, just like Shabbat, so it cannot serve as proof.
- In the end Rabbi Akiva did not accept Rabbi Eliezer's reasoning, neither that separate Shabbatot count as separate bodies nor that sub-labors count like full labors.
- The halacha does not follow Rabbi Eliezer.
Bartenura
Summary
The chapter closes with a sustained debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer. Akiva asked: one who in a single lapse does many derivative labors of one primary labor across several Shabbatot — one sin-offering or many? Rabbi Eliezer answered "one for each," arguing, all the more so, from the menstruating woman, whose single prohibition still divides into separate offerings. Rabbi Akiva repeatedly refuted the inference — with her there are two prohibitions, with Shabbat one — and Rabbi Eliezer answered each time with a new proof: menstruating minors, then an animal. Akiva countered that the animal case is itself uncertain, just like Shabbat, so it proves nothing.